Dublin, Oct. 04, 2022 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — The report “The Quantum Threat to Blockchain: Emerging Business Opportunities” has been added to from ResearchAndMarkets.com offer.
This report identifies the challenges and opportunities arising from the threat that quantum computers pose to the “blockchain” mechanism that makes cryptocurrencies viable as a form of money and plays an important role in future “smart contracts”, new supply chain strategies and other innovative IT deployments.
That quantum is a major threat to the future is beyond doubt. According to a recent study by consulting firm Deloitte, around a quarter of Bitcoin in circulation in 2022 is vulnerable to quantum attacks. White House National Security Memorandum/NSM-10, issued May 4, 2022, indicated the urgency to address imminent quantum computing threats and significant risks to the economic and national security of the United States.
Although this report focuses primarily on the quantum threat to the integrity of cybercurrencies, the applicability of blockchain (and therefore the quantum threat) is much broader than new types of currency. Blockchain technology has been proposed for a wide range of transactions, including insurance, real estate, voting, supply chain tracking, gambling, and more.
A quantum computer compromised blockchain would allow eavesdropping, unauthorized client authentication, signed malware, hiding encrypted sessions, man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack, falsified documents and emails. These attacks can lead to disruption of critical operations, damage to reputation and trust, and loss of intellectual property, financial assets and regulated data. Note that this report covers both technical and policy issues related to blockchain quantum vulnerability.
As it stands, blockchains are secured with relatively varied encryption schemes. However, quantum computers will have the computing power to break these patterns as they gain power. Predictions of when quantum computers will reach such power range from five years to forever, but the threat is looming over the cryptocurrency industry as a whole and dampening its prospects.
Quantum computers directly threaten conventional public key/private key cryptography blockchain technologies because they can break the computer security assumptions of elliptic curve cryptography. They also significantly weaken the security of critical private key or hash function algorithms, which protect blockchain secrets.
Moreover, some of the early spending on safe quantum technology in the cybercurrency market will no doubt be used to protect data from later attacks when quantum computing resources become mature. This question becomes more important as we get closer to the day when powerful quantum computers become a reality. But pre-emptive action against the quantum threat means business opportunities in this space are emerging right now.
As detailed in this report, the publisher sees major business opportunities to protect blockchain and blockchain-dependent technologies from future quantum computing intrusions. One area this report focuses on in particular is post-quantum encryption (PQC), in which relatively traditional encryption schemes are designed that are simply much harder to crack than the encryption schemes currently in use.
With NIST announcing a new set of PQC standards in July 2022, the publisher believes that PQC companies will receive major near-term investment due to growing concerns about bad actors gaining access to quantum computing resources.
The publisher believes that there is also a need for relatively inexpensive theoretically secure information solutions (ITS) that instantly reinforce the standardized cryptography systems used in blockchains. Thus, this report also discusses quantum-enabled blockchain architectures based on quantum random number generators (QRNG) and quantum key distribution (QKD).
With NIST announcing a new set of PQC standards in July 2022, PQC companies will soon receive major near-term investments, much of which will apply to blockchain. However, not all NIST-based PQC solutions will be feasible for blockchain use. Given the nature and complexity of PQC, it will take years of planning for a successful migration to PQC-backed Blockchain protection.
Early spending on safe quantum technology in the blockchain market will go to protecting data from later attacks when quantum computing resources become mature. This question becomes more important as we get closer to the day when powerful quantum computers become a reality. But data theft today requires preventive action. The quantum threat to blockchain means business opportunities in this space are emerging right now.
There is a need for low cost and theoretically secure (ITS) solutions that instantly reinforce the standardized cryptography systems used in blockchains. Quantum blockchain architectures based on quantum random number generators (QRNG) and quantum key distribution (QKD) have already been widely discussed in this context. Another important concept is quantum blockchain, which refers to an entire blockchain or certain aspects of blockchain functionality running in quantum computing environments.
Mining is another aspect of blockchains vulnerable to quantum attacks. Mining is the consensus process that certifies new transactions and protects blockchain activities. One of the risks of mining is that miners using quantum computers could launch a 51% attack. A 51% attack occurs when a single entity controls more than half of the blockchain’s computing power. A quantum mining attack would sap the hash power of the network.
Main topics covered:
Chapter One: Introduction
1.1 Purpose and scope of this report
1.1.1 The threat of quantum computers to the blockchain
1.2 Cryptography Background to this report
1.2.1 Organizations concerned
1.2.2 NIST PQC Efforts and Beyond
1.2.3 Addressable market for quantum-safe cryptocurrency
1.3 Objectives of this report
Chapter 2: Classic Blockchain Cryptography and Quantum Computing Attacks
2.1 Overview of the Quantum Threat
2.2 NIST and post-quantum cryptography
2.2.1 Structure of the NIST PQC effort
2.2.2 Importance of asymmetric digital signatures
2.2.3 Impact of doubling the key size
2.2.4 Security strength of the algorithm
2.3 Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
2.4 Quantum Attack Resource Estimates for Breaking ECC and DSA
2.5 Quantum strong cryptography for blockchains
2.5.1 Taproot and Bitcoin Core
2.5.2 Impact of NIST-Based PQC Algorithms
2.6 Post-quantum Random Oracle Model
2.6.1 Modeling random oracles for quantum attackers
2.7 Summary of this chapter
Chapter Three: Blockchain-like Quantum Opportunities
3.1 Blockchain basics
3.1.1 What are classic blockchains?
3.2 Blockchain enabled by Quantum
3.2.1 Role of Quantum-safe security technologies
3.3 Blockchain security
3.3.1 Role of conventional cryptography
3.3.2 Attacks against classical cryptography
220.127.116.11 Some known attacks against ECDSA
18.104.22.168 Generation of ECDSA key pairs:
22.214.171.124 Calculation of signatures:
126.96.36.199 Blockchain Security Summary:
3.4 Mitigating Cyber Attacks on Blockchains
3.5 Blockchain security: entropy/randomness
3.5.1 Examples of low entropy attacks
3.6 Evolution of the Random Number Generator Product
3.6.4 OpenSSL 3.0
3.7 Summary of this chapter
Chapter Four: Quantum Impacts on the Cryptocurrency Industry
4.1 Qubit and quantum gates
4.1.2 Quantum gates
4.1.3 Quantum Fourier transform
4.1.5 Amplitude boost
4.2 Quantum algorithms
4.2.1 Shor’s algorithm
4.3 Quantum Threat Specific to Blockchains
4.3.1 Risk of quantum attack in authentication
4.3.2 Grover’s algorithm and hashing
4.4 Risk of Quantum Attack in Mining
4.5 Occasional attacks
4.6 Blockchain Data Structures
4.7 Summary of this chapter
Chapter Five: Quantum Hash and QKD
5.1 Classical to quantum hash functions
5.1.1 Summary: Quantum hash functions
5.2 Quantum Key Distribution (QKD)
5.2.1 Technical issues
5.2.2 Issues requiring work in Blockchain Enabled QKD
188.8.131.52 Summary: QKD Technical Issues and Blockchain Integration
184.108.40.206 Software-defined Networking QKD and Blockchain
5.3 Notes on interface protocols
5.3.1 Southbound interface
5.3.2 North interface protocol
5.3.3 Resource allocation
5.4 Steps Blockchain Organizations Can Take Now
5.5 Summary of this chapter
About the editor
About the analyst
Acronyms and abbreviations used in this report
For more information on this report visit https://www.researchandmarkets.com/r/4iih20
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